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This  paper  presents  a  model  of  endogenously  deternined  contract
enforcement  with  t\^7o  equilibria.  In  one,  contracts  are  enforced  and
market  activity  is  unhanpered.  In  the  other,  contracts  are  not
enforced,  discouraging  narket  activity,  which  leaves  the  nation
without  the  resources  and  incentives  to  enforce  contlacts.  Even
identically  endowed  nations  may  therefore  find  thernselves  in  very
different  equilibria.  The  model  is  offered  co  explain  the  wide  and
persistent  gap  between  developed  and  undeveloped  economies,
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One  of the greatest  puzzles  in all of economics  and  certainly  the puzzle  with
the greatest  impact on welfare is the gap between  rich  and poor nations. The
persistence  and magnitude  of this gap defies all the standard  explanations  of classical
economics.  If the gap  is due  to differences  in physical  or human  capital,  the classical
model  predicts  the  movement  or internal  accumulation  of such  capital  to close  the  gap.
This we do not observe,I
What then  can account  for the enormous  and  persistent  gap  between  rich and
poor nations?  The most  common  answer  in the recent  literature  is that some  form of
increasing,  or at least,  non-diminishing  returns  generates  sustainable  differences  in
output and growth.2  However,  underdeveloped  nations  do not appear  to be merely
smaller versions of  developed  economies;  they exhibit significant differences  in
political and economic  structures.  It is among  these  differences  that this paper  will
search  for the key to the gap  in economic  performance.
An obvious  difference  between  developed  and  undeveloped  economies  is their
legal systems.  Laws and private contracts are rarely enforced in  undeveloped
economies.3  It is easy  to imagine  how a poorly developed  legal system  prevents
economies  from developing.  Without the enforcement  of  laws and contracts,
participation  in market activity is discouraged  by the likely prospect  that anyone
engaging  in market  activity  is unlikely to receive  its full benefits.  More generally,  any
misappropriation  of market activity, by dishonest  contractors,  bandits,  or corrupt
government  officials,  discourages  participation  in the  market,
rSee,  for exanple,  Lucas  (1990).
,^ zFor  a useful  survey,  see  Romer  (1989).
e- rEven within developed  economies  we hnd the coincidence  of [re most  desperate  pockets  of poverty and
the areas  without effective law enforcement.A more  diffrcult question  is why any  nation,  knowing  the consequences,  would
fail to develop  its legal infrastructure.  A theory that starts  from assumptions  that
some  countries  have  more  honest  citizens  or greater  enforcement  skills would not go
very far in increasing  our understanding  of the barriers  to development.  We need  our
theory  to explain  not only the cost  of an ineffective  legal system  but also why poor
nations  do not improve  their  legal  system.
This paper  is an attempt  to formalize the role of the legal infrastnrcture  in
economic  development.  Its starting  point is a model,  presented  in section  2, in which
two nations,  identical in tastes  and technology,  may display a wide difference  in
investment  and  output.  In the  model  the enforcement  of laws and  contracts  is needed
in order to encourage  productive  market  activity. The degree  of this enforcement  is
chosen  by a coalition  of optimizing  agents  interested  in encouraging  production.  The
model  displays  two distinct  equilibria  -- a "rich" one,  in which all laws and  contracts
are  enforced,  leaving  market  activity unimpeded  by dishonest  behavior,  and  a "poor"
one,  in which there  is no enforcement,  resulting  in a lack of market  activity, which
limits the  ability and  the  will of the  government  to enforce  laws  and  contracts.
In sections  3 and  4, the  paper  aiters  the assumptions  of the model  in ways  that
illustrate  environmental  factors  that  may  contribute  to the likelihood  that a nation  may
find itself  poor and  engulfed  by corruption.  The  basic  model  is extended  to show  that
reserves,  commitment,  economic  coordination,  and  political stability  can  be helpful in
reaching  a rich equilibrium with honest  behavior.  The model suggests  that honest
behavior  is more  likely in an  economy  in the  following  circumstances:  i) if the  economy
has reserves  or credit that could be used to enforce  honest  behavior but are not
subject  to losses  through  corruption;  ii) if the  govemment  can  commit  itself  in advance
to the  enforcement  of contracts  and  laws;  iii) if producers  can  coordinate  investment  at
a level high enough  to make  enforcement  worthwhile;  iv) if the government  is stable
enough  to make  credible  a reputation  for enforcement,The extensions  of  the model generate  additional interesting predictions.
Economies  with lower-value  investment  projects  will deal with a smaller  variety of
agents  (e.g.,  suppliers)  in the  market  and  will make  more  extensive  use  in producdon
of family or social  ties.  There  is a ricly'poor  gap  in the sense  that  large  differences  in
output may result from small differences  in endowments  or productivity. Dynamic
versions  of the model generate  pattems  of economic  $owth  that include sustained,
nonconverging  rates  of output growth, permanent  economic  stagnation,  and abrupt
take-offs  in output $owth. We will  also  find a reason  that developing  nations  may
wish to encourage  investment  beyond  the level that would be chosen  under  laissez-
faire  even  if production  of one  firm has  no direct  external  effect  on the  productivity  of
another.
2. Multiple Equllibria in a Model of Contract  and Law Enforcement
The rnodel:
There are continua  of measure  1 of two types of people -  producers  and
controllers  -- in an  economy  lasting  two periods.
Each  producer  is endowed  in the  first period  with y units  of non-storable  time,
which can be divided between  leisure or production.  The utility  of a producer  is
described  by a twice-continuously  differentiable  quasi-concave  function  U(h, c) of his
(non-negative)  leisure and consumption,  respectively.  Consumption  occurs in the
second  period.  The first derivatives  of r7,  and  u, of U(h, c) are  finite for h 2 0, c 2 0.
A producer  produces  /(t)  units  of the consumption  good  from /<  units  of time,
where  /(.) is a continuously  differentiable,  increasing,  concave  function  with/(0)  = 0
and  /(0)  < "" . To produce  goods,  a producer  must deal  with controllers.  The market
production  of each  producer  is evenly  exposed  to the  entirc  continuum  of controllers.
Each  controller  has  the  ability  to expropriate  all ouput falling under  its control.against  theft. A related  interpretation  would define  controllers  as  corrupt  elements  of
the government  -- perhaps  police,  soldiers,  or bureaucrats  -- that  use  their power  over
public commerce  to solicit bribes  or otherwise  acquire  market goods.
E  quilibrium  :
Let & denote  the period 1 allocation  of time to production  by each  producer.
(Since  the measure  of producers  and controllers  is the same,  /c also represents  tie
inputs  under  the control  of each  controller.)  A sub-game  perfect  Nash  equilibrium  is
then defined as values  of g, k, and  n consistent  with  the following  sequence  of
decisions:
i) each  producer  individually  chooses  his input t to maximize  his utility, taking
as  given  the  the behavior  of the  controllers;
ii)  each  conholler decides  whether  or not to flee in order to maximize expected
utility, taking  as  given  the  behavior  of the  other  controllers;
iii) producers  collectively  choose  the  resources  8 to be  devoted  to enforcement,
subject  to the constraint  that the enforcement  resources  do not exceed  the
amount  repaid  by non-fleeing  controllers.
The  enforcement  decision  (iii) is simple.  Although  enforcement  is a  public  good,
thete is no disagreement  about  its provision because  all producers  face the same
problem.  Producers  will  choose  to apprehend  a fleeing controller if and  only if the value
of the goods  taken,  f(k),  exceeds  the cost of enforcement,  9.  Because  all contracts
have the same  value,  producers  will  apprehend  either all who flee or no one:
3=0
0n
if f(k)  <  e,
if f(k)  > e (r.2)The decision  of each  controller  (ii) strongly  depends  on the decisions  of the
other  controllers.  An honest  controller,  one  who doesn't  flee,  consumes  zero  goods. A
dishonest  or corrupt controller  has  a utility of -z if caught  and  f(k) if not caught.  An
controller  will wish to flee if the expected  relum to fleeing  exceeds  0. In Figure 1 the
expected  return to fleeing (L-tt)f(k) - rt  = (7- gl4n)f(k) - zglOn  is shown  for given
positive  values  of g and  &  as  a function  of n.
fi-(s/il(x) - (slq)z
Figure 1
[The horizontal  segment  of the returns  to dishonesty  graphed  in Figure I  represents
the  range  over  which  capture  is certain  (z = 1).1
From Figure I we can  identify three  candidates  for equilibrium, n = 0, n = 1, and
n = fi.If  O  < n < fi.,  the expected  return  to dishonesty  is below  zero,  implying that  all
controllers  will  be honest  (z = 0). This candidate  for equilibrium  exists  because  the
small number of dishonest  controllers  makes  it  certain that any single controller
deviating  from honesty  will be caught.  In contrast,  if fi<n  < 1, the large  number  ofdishonest  controllers  makes  it likely that any single controller can get away with
dishonest  behavior.  In this case  all controllers  will choose  dishonesty  (z  = 1).  These
two candidates  for equilibrium are stable.  There  is a third candidate  for equilibrium at n
= fr, where the returns to  honesty and dishonesty  are equal. This equilibrium
candidate,  however,  is unstable.  If  an arbinarily small but strictly positive measure  of
controllers were to deviate  from their equilibrium behavior,  all others  would deviate  in
the same  direction  so that  all would be  dishonest  or all honest.
The analysis  will concentrate  on the stable  equilibrium  candidates  at the two
extremes  (z = I and  n = 0). The  equilibrium  condition  can  then  be  written  formally  as
n=  0 \f (I- gl0n  )f(k) - zgt0n <O
1  if (t- st4n  )f(k)  - zgl0n > 0  (1.3)
The input decision (i) is more standard.  The expected  return to input is a
function of the measure  of honest  controllers,  n. A producer  perfectly diversified across
controllers  receives  f(k)  from each  of 1-n honest  controllers  and from each  of nn
apprehended  dishonest  ones.1  Each  producer  faces  the budget  constraints
(1.4)
(  1.s)
A producer  choosing  inputs,  /c,  to maximize  personal  utility will obey  the  first order
Kuhn-Tucker  condition
;  <  (t'n)f(O) + ntf(0)  =  (t-n)f(0) +  ktqfQ)  fork--0
uo -  =  (I-n)f(k)+  ntf(k)  =  (1-n)f(k) +  (s/0)f(k)  fory>k>0
uh
; 
> (1-n)f(9 + nrf(y)  =  (|-n)f(y) +  k/A)f@  fork=v.  (1'6)
h+  k
(|-n)f(k) +  ntcf(k)  =  c + g
llt  is assumed  here  rhat  all controllers  are  active.  Since  the  populations  of both savers  and  controllers
have  be€n  set  to one,  k may be  interpreled  as  both invesunent  per controller  and  investment  per saver.Together,  conditions  (1.2),  (1.3),  and  (1.6)  define  equilibria  in k, g, and  n.
In an equilibrium  of complete  honesty  (n = 0), the model  becomes  a standard
model  of saving  in which  production  is undertaken  until its marginal  product  equals  the
marginal  rate  of substitut  ion (f  '(k) = 
T  ,,  Let us label  this level of input &*. Any
single  controller  who deviates  from the strategy  of honesty  can  be caught.  Producers
will have  an incentive  to catch  any dishonest  controller  if the value  of the goods  he
controls,  /(/c),  exceeds  the cost  of enforcement,  0, No enforcement  costs  are  actually
incurred  in equilibrium  because  no one  is dishonest.  (Recall  that  enforcement  effort is
chosen after  controllers decide whether or not to  f7ee.)  lf  f(k)  <  0, the threat of
enforcement  is not credible and  there  exists no equilibrium with honest  behavior.
In  an equilibrium of  complete dishonesty  (  n  = |  ), no enforcement  is
undertaken  ( g = 0 ) so that  confollers rationally  anticipate  that there  is no chance  of
being  caught  for dishonesty.  Anticipating  the  lack of enforcement,  no one  will save  ( k
= 0 ). Enforcement  fails to occur  for two reasons,  each  of which is sufficient  to stop
enfolcement  on its own. First, since  everything  is stolen  by the dishonest  controllen,
the producers  find themselves  without  the  means  to enforce  honest  behavior.  We may
call this a revenue constraint. Second  is ur incentive constraint. If  dishonesty  is
pervasive,  the lower rate of retum received  by producers  induces  them to reduce their
inputs.  Inputs  thus  fall below  the level for which the benefit  of enforcement  exceeds
the  cost  (i.e.,  as  fr approaches  O, f(U  < e).
The multiplicity of equilibria  illustrates  the important  interconnection  of legal
infrastructure  and  production  activity. Two economies,  with identical  technologies  of
production  and  enforcement,  may arrive  at entirely  different  outcomes.  One  may find
itself prosperous  with laws and  contracts  that  are  always  honored,  while another  may
.uh 'A  sof  ution with k = 0 and ;<f 
'(0)  is also possible  but is not ve.ry  interesting.Iind itself both too poor to be able  to enforce  the system  of laws and contracts  that
would enable  it to acquire  wealth and  too poor to make  enforcement  worthwhile.
In either equilibrium no enforcement  costs  are incurred and no expropriation  of
positve value occurs.  As  a result, not even the controllers are better off  in the
equilibrium  with dishonesty,  and  thus  the  equilibrium  with honesty  is Pareto  superior
to that with  dishonesty.  The welfare cost of  dishonesty  is  not represented  by
enforcement  costs nor by the goods  that are actually taten from their rightful  owners
but by the  lack of investment  in productive  enterprises.
3. Eliminating  Corruption
In order to illustrate the key assumptions  that lead to the existence  of  an
equilibrium  with complete  comrption,  in the  following sections  we examine  the  model
under some  alternative  assumptions.  It  is hoped thal we may thereby learn what
might eliminate  or contribute  to the existence  of comrpt,  low-output  equilibria.  Recall
that an economy  stuck in a poor, corrupt equilibrium was unable  to move to the
superior  equilibrium  because  of both a rev€nue  constraint  and  an incentive  constraint.
Let us now consider  first assumotions  that would relax in  turn the tevenue and
incentive  consfiaints.
Getting around the revenue  constraint:
In the model of the preceeding  section,  the existence  of an equilibrium with low
inputs and pervasive  dishonesty  is in part a consequence  of the assumed  need  to
finance  enforcement  from the  goods  that  had  not been  stolen,  As a result,  enforcement
can not be self-financing.  The revenue  constraint  is removed  if  the assumption  is
dropped  or if  enforcement  can be funded out of internal reserves  or loans from ab'road
that are not themselves  subject  to losses  from dishonest  behavior.  These  reserves  or
loans  must be large enough  to capture  enough  controllers  to reduce  the return fromi0
dishonesty  below zero even if  all  controllers were to behave dishonestly.  The
government  must also be able to credibly commit to repaying whatever  loans it
requires.
Comrption  itself may also  make  it difficult to raise  or apply  revenue  to the  job
of enforecement,  Dishonest  behavior  is as likely  to come from comrpt bureaucrats  as
from common thieves or swindlers. Therefore, there may be little  reason  to assume
that reserves,  foreign loans to the government,  or the enforcement  effort itself will  not
be also subject  to losses  from comtption.  If dishonesty  pervades  the govemment,  no
single  official will fear apprehension  as  the result  of misappropriating  funds,  whether
the source  of the  funds  is internal  or external.  Nor will he  fear  detection  if he accepts  a
bribe in retum for overlooking  the misbehavior  of others.
Getting  arcund the  incentive  constraint:
If  the revenue  constraint  is nevertheless  not binding, an economy  may free
itself  from the  possibility  of the  comrpted  equilibrium  only if it can  also  get  around  the
incentive  constraint.  The incentive  constraint  stems  from the assumed  sequence  of
decisions.  It  was assumed  that the enforcement  decision  is made after the savings
decision  and  the  choice  of honest  or dishonest  Lchavior.  This sequence  implies  that an
economy  in an  equilibrium  of dishonesty  will rationally  choose  not to enforce  contracts
or laws because  the value of the investment  at risk approaches  zero,  thereby  falling
below  the  cost  of enforcement.  This incentive  constraint  can  be surmounted  in any  one
of the  following ways  -- a commitment  to enforcement,  agrcement  among  producers  to
a high level  of inputs,  or a reputation  for enforcement  (in an  infinitely  repeated  version
of the  model).
Commitment:  The sequence  of decisions  is crucial  to the existence  of multiple
equilibria  in the model.  If the  govemment  were  able  to make  a binding  commitmont  toLL
enforce all contracts  and laws, the equilibrium with dishonest  behavior could be
eliminated.  Indeed,  if  this commitment  is binding but does not require any
expenditures  before  the choice  of honest  or dishonest  behavior  (for example,  if  the
government  makes  a constitutional  pledge),  the dishonest  equilibrium is eliminated
without  incurring  any  costs  since  all controllers  will act  honestly.
It is diffrcult,  however,  to imagine  pledges  that  can  not  be broken  if reneging  on
the pledge  later proves  to be in the best  interest  of all. If  reneging  is possible,  the
commitment  is not credible,  and  a stronger  form  of commitment  is requircd.
There  is no problem  of credibility  if the govemment  actually  spends  resources
to create  enforcement  capability before dishonest  behavior can occur. The equilibrium
sequence  of decisions  would  then  be altered  as  follows:
i) each  producer  chooses  his investment  ft to maximize  his utility, taking as
given  the equilibrium value  of n;
ii) producers  collectively  expend  rcsources  for enforcement,  g;
iii) each  controller  decides  whether  or not to flee  in order  to maximize  expected
utility, taking  as  given  the  behavior  of the  other  controllers.
Controllers  take as given the enforcement  power allocated  by producers.  If
these  resources  are sufficient to catch  enough  controllers  to reduce  the controllers
expected  return below zero, even if  all controllers  are dishonest,  then complete
honesty  is the unique equilibrium. Because  resources  must actually be spent on
enforcement,  honesty  is not costlessly  achieved,  as it was in the honest  equilibrium
where  the government  acted  after  the  controllers.
If the enforcement  effort committed  is insufficient to capture  all controllers, the
dishonest  equilibrium  may still exist.  If all other  controllers  were  dishonest,  any  single
controller  would find that  his captue is less  than  certain  because  the large  number  of
dishonest  controllers  exceeds  the number that can be caught using the resourcesallocated  to enforcement.  If his chances  of capture  are  sufficiently  smail,  he will also
choose  dishonesty  and there  will  exist an equilibrium in which all controllers  are
dishonest.
Input Coordination'  A less  expensive  way to co rmit to the enforcement  of
contracts  requires tlat  producers  jointly  agree to a high level of  investment  in
productive  inputs.  Recall  that the incentive  constraint  on enforcement  resulted  from
the reduction  in the value of contracts  that occurs  when each  producer  fears  more
reneging.  No single  producer  can  commit  to investment  wonh the  costs  of enforcement
because  of the assumption  that each  producer  spreads  his inputs over a range of
controllers  so that the inputs of any single,  infinitesimally small producer  that are
entrusted  to any single  controller are insignificant.  When investment  in productive
inputs falls to the extent that  f(k)  < 9,  all realize that contracts  will  not be enforced.  If
producers  agree  that  each  of them  will invest  ft such  that  /(D  ) 0, producers  will give
themselves  the incentive  to enforce  every  contract  on which a controller  reneges.  In
this way the producers  may collectively  commit to the enforcement  of all contracts.
The commitment  is credible  because  the act of investment  prccedes  the controllers'
decision  whether  to be  honest  or dishonest,  but convinces  controllers  that  enforcement
will take  place.  It incurs  no direct  enforcement  costs  because  dishonesty  is deterred.l
To reach  the  level  of investment  at which  producers  will enforce  contracts  may
require  more  investment  than  producers  would choose  on their own. In an (interior)
equilibrium  when  controllers  always  behave  honestly,  a producer  will choose  an input
level t*  satisfying  uflus - fft*).lf  f(k*) < fl  producers  must choose  either  to force
themselves  to invest  enough  to make  contracts  worth enforcing  tf  such  rhat  /(El = Ol
llnput  coordination  works here  as it does  in Bryant (1983) and other models  in which there are multiple
Pareto-ranked  eouilibria in the absenc€  of the  coonlination  of investment.IJ
or to give  up on oulput  and  enforcement  (set  k = 0). They  will choose  /c  if the  utility at
i-_._. /<  exceeds  the  utiiity at  /r  = 0, which  occurs  it U(y - k, 0)  -  U(y,O)  >  0.
Investment  coordination  would not be needed  if each  producer  dealt  with only
one  controller,  whom he could  specifically  target  for capture  if the controller  flees.  In
this case  it is possible  that each  producer  alone  can  invest  enough  to commit  himself
- -.4. to enforcing  a contract  Wk) > 01. Such  a private  provision  of enforcement  effort is
efficient only if there  are  no increasing  returns  to scale  in enforcement.  This case  is
studied  in greater  detail in section  4.
The  Trap  of Underdevelopment  '  The  coordination  of inputs  (together  with the
assumption  of unlimited  reserves)  removes  the multiplicity of equilibria  for any  single
economy  but does  not end  the dramatic  gap  between  rich and  poor economies.  If the
economy does not have the resources  to  invest enough to  make enforcement
worthwhile  (li.e.,If f(k*) < 0)1, the  only equilibrium  is the  comtpt  one.  Low values  of
productivity  /(ft*), or desired  investment,  7.r' (which  is an increasing  function  of the
initiai endowment,  y), or high  values  of enforcement  costs  make  this equilibrium  more
likely. In this way poor nations,  those  who start  with low levels  of productivity  and
endowments,  may  find it impossible  to reach  a reach  an  honest  equilibrium.  Moreover,
if  growth in  technology  and endowments  is endogenously  determined  by market
activity, the poor nation may have no prospect  of growing to the point where the
honest  equilibrium  is possible.
To illustrate  the gap  between  rich and  poor, consider  a continuum  of nations
that  differs continuously  in a, a productivity  parameter  such  that  output  equals  of(/c,).
Let k(a) denote  the input that  would be chosen  in an honest  equilibrium  as  a function
of a.  If  consumption  is a normal good, output, af(k(e)),  will  be an increasing,
continuous  function  of a defined  by the producers'  first order  condition  in an honest
equilibrium  fu7lu, -  q&)l.Irut  a**  denote  the  value  of a for which  af(k(d)  = A.  Asbefore,  if  af(k(a))  < 0, producers  must choose  either to invest enough  to make
contracts  worth enforcing [E  such that  affi;  = 0 ] or ro invest  nothing (set  & = 0).
They  will choose  Iif  the  utility at  E exceeds  the  utility atk = 0, which  occurs  if
u(y4,0)  - u(y,0)  >  0 (3.1)
When  evaluated  at equality,  (3.1) implicitly defines  some  a* below which & = 0 and
above  which ft = t  (the left-hand side of  (3.1) being increasing  in  a ). Figure 2
Figure  2
Similar cross-sections  would be found for economies  differing in y or 0 or in some
p:fameter  reflecting  the desire  to save.
Figure 2 dramatically  illustrates  the gap  between  rich and  poor. Nations  with
only a marginal  difference  in technology  around  a* find themselves  producing  greatly
differing  levels  of output.
The model's implications for  growth will  depend on whether growth is
endogenous  or exogenous.  Imagine a repeated  version of the model in which the
output  from one  period  can  be  used  as  an  input to production  in the  next  period.  If the
productive  technology  grows exogenously  (represented  by a value of d that starts
illustrates  this  cross-section  of equilibria  by graphing  output  as  a function  of a.near zero but gtows), an economy will  languish for a while in the region of no output
undl  a reaches  a*.  At that point the economy will  experience  a dramatic take-off in
output.
If, however, growth in the technology  parameter  requires economic activity, an
economy that starts  with a value of a below a*  will  never reach the take-off threshold
because  the absence  of market activity prevents  an increase  in technology.
Reputation in  a Repeated  Game,' A  government  can also surmount the
incentive consEaint  altogether  if it can acquire  a reputation  for enforcing contracts  and
laws. If  the game  between  producers  and controllers  is repeated  indefinitely, the
government  may be able to develop a reputation  for enforcement  that will  keep
controllers  honest. If the government  can  develop  such  a reputation,  it can  eliminate
the  dishonest  equilibrium  even  if the single  period  costs  of enforcement  should  always
exceed  the  value  of the contracts.
Suppose  for example  that the government  has  reserves  sufficient  to catch  all
dishonest  controllers  but the cost  of catching  any single  controller  exceeds  what can
be recovered  Le > f&)  l. If the controllers act before the government  in a game  played
only once,  they can  be sure  that  the government  will choose  not to enforce  contracts.
If, however,  the game  is repeated  indefinitely,  the government  can  play a strategy  of
always  enforcing conEacts,  to which the best response  of controllers  is to always
behave  honestly.  Here the infrnitely lived government  plays a game against  an infinite
sequence  of one period lived controllers,  an analog  to Selten's  (1978) chain-store
game.  Kreps  and  Wilson (1982)  and  Fudenberg  and  Levine (1989)  demonstrate  that  if
there is some  uncertainty  about  the nature  of the infinitely lived player's strategy  or its
payoffs,  it will pay the infinitely lived player  to develop  a reputation  as  a Stackleberg
leader.  In this model,  the government  will develop  a reputation  for always  enforcingcontracts,  inducing controllers to always behave
respond  to this reputation by acting honestly, no
honestly,l  Because  controllers
resources  are actually used in
enforcing  contracts.2
Notice that a reputation  for enforcing contracts  and laws does more than
eliminate  the dishonest  equilibrium  when there  would otherwise  be a multiplicity of
equilibria [i.e., when  /(k*) > 0 ]. A reputation  for enforcement  even  induces  honesty
when  there  exists  no equilibrium  with honesty  in the two period  model [the case  of
f(k*)  < e\
The difference in  the equilibrium of  a two-period game and its infinitely
repeated  counterpart  illustrates  the importance  of political stability  in development.  A
government  with a short expected  tenure  is less able to develop a reputation  for
contract  enforcement  and  other  anti-comrption  measures  than  a govemment  embedded
in a stable  legal  tradition  with no anticipated  end.3
4.  Limiting  Producers'  Exposure  to Controllers:
An assumption  key to the existence  of a dishonest  equilibrium is that each
infinitesimally  small  producer  must  deal  with a wide span  of controllers;  as a result  it
is never wonhwhile for a single producer  to go after any controller who has wronged
him. A wronged  producer  would be willing on his own to go after a fleeing controller as
long as the value of his personal  investment  is not exceeded  by the cost of
enforcement  V@ > 01. Therefore,  if producers  are unable  to commit to enforcement  by
coordinating  their investments  to a sufficiently high level, a producer  wili  want to limit
lFor a discount  factor sufficiently close  to one.
2 If controllers,  not tie govemment,  were inhnitely lived and  coukl coordinate  their activity, they are the
ones  who would develop  a reputation.  Recall that when controllers  play a strategy  of taking everything,
they get nothing because  production is entirely discouraged.  Therefore they would want to develop a
reputation for not iaking everything, in order o  encourage  production, a fraclion of which they can
misappropriate  -  much  as  a govemment  does  not want a reputation  for trxing at 100%.
3what determines  which countries  will enjoy stable  govemment  is not addressed  here.17
the number of  controllers  to which he is exposed.  If,  for example,  we interpret
controllers  as contractors  supplying an essential  but generic input to production,
producers  will  wish to contmct  with a single supplier  of the input. With his entire
investment  in the hands  of a single  supplier,  a single  producer  acting  on his own will
have  a greater  incentive  to enforce  honest  behavior  on that supplier.  If he knows  that
the producer  will  want to enforce  contracts,  the supplier  will  behave  honestly.
Of course,  there  may  be costs  to reducing  the  variety  of people  with whom  one
deals.  The services  of controllers  may not be entirely interchangeable,  so that a
reduction  in a producer's  variety of contacts  with controllers  reduces  his productivity.
Let us now alter our model to allow producers  a choice of the number  of
controllers  with whom  they  will deal.  Assume  that  each  producer  is not infinitesimally
small but that there  are a large  number  of independenr  producers  (each  of measure
one).  There  is a continuum  of controllers,  measuring  M in total.  Each  producer  will
select  nr,  the measure  of controllers  with whom  he  will deal.  To make  this  choice  non-
trivial, let us assume  that  output  per producer  is a continuously  differentiable  function
F(k,m), increasing  in both investment  and  the measure  of controllers  with whom he
deals.  Each  controller  dealing  with a producer  controls  an  equal  share  of the  producer's
output;  i.e., he can  abscond  with  ryP  goods.  Let us assume  for simplicity that a
producer  gets no utility  from leisure (un= 0) so that he always  invests  his entire
endowment  of time (t = y). (This allows  us to concentrate  on the choice  of n.)  A1l
enforcement  is privately provided  and can be targeted  at any specific  controller.  It
costs  I goods  to catch  a fleeing controller.  Enforcement  by a producer  returns  only
those  goods  stolen  from him.
Given that  enforcement  is now to be independently  financed,  a controller  will
abscond  with all of the investment  in his control  of each  producer  who will lack the
incentive  to capture  him. A producer  will want to capture  a fleeing controller  if thevalue  of the  investment  in that  controller's  hands,  ryP, 
" 
not less  than  the cost  of
enforcement,  9. An equilibrium  with honesty  thus  requires  that  F(y,m) )  rz0. Since
F(y,m) is increasing  in m, a producer  will want the largest  m meeting  this incentive
constraint.  An interior equilibrium  ( 0 < nr <M  ) requires  that  F(y,m) - rn9  --O and
F^(y,m) - I  < 0. These  conditions  implicitly define  the equilibirum  value  of rz as  a
function  of desired  investment,  y, and  the cost  of enforcement,  0. It is easily  verified
that  in equilibrium,  m is an  increasing  function  ofy and  a decreasing  function  of ft i.e.,
where  investment  projects  are small or enforcement  costs  are high (perhaps  in less
developed  economies),  producers  will  choose  to interact  with a minimal variety of
controlling  agents,  lowering  the  return  to their  investment.
@roducers  might also limit their exposure  to dishonesty  by resuicting their
economic  contacts  to groups  with mutual trust such as families or distinct social
groups within  which trust naturally exists or  can be easily enforced.r  This  is
consistent  with the prevalence  of family-owned  businesses  in developing  countries  as
well  as the domination of  commerce  by small minorities like  the Indians and
Portusuese  in Africa or the Chinese  in Asia outside  of China.)
A Model of Sustained  Growth:
Notice that greater  investment  of the productive  input (lc)  results  in a greater
variety of contacts  (m), which causes  an increase  in the marginal product of the
productive  input. This suggests  that  a dynamic  version  of the  model,  along  the  lines  of
Romer's  (  1987) model of growth through specialization,  may be able to generate
sustained  srowth.
llt  may be that a small minority socially separated  from the majority can enforce  honest  bebavior within
the group through the threat  of ostracism,  a 0rreat  more  srsily enforced  in a small group than a large one
and more  painful to lhose  not socially  accepted  in the larger society.t9
mt
lrt  a producer's  ourput  in period  rbe  | (xti)o  dxri (with 0 < a < 1), a function
d
of rnt, the  number  of controllers  with whom  the  producer  deals,  and.rf, defined  as  the
amount  invested  with any single  conuoller.  Assume  that mlandxf  can take  on any
positive  values.  In the assumed  absence  of investment  coordination,  a producer  with a
given  level  of resources  *l available  for investrnent  will choose  x1i  and  ml to maximize
output subject  to the incentive  constraint  that the value  of his investment  with each
controller is not exceeded  by the cost of enforcement  (x/)d  > 0. This constraint
ensures  that the controller  knows that the producer  will want to capture  and  punish
any dishonest  controller.  The producer's  optimal  investment  strategy  is to spread  his
investment  equally  across  controllers  1xri1  =  k lry and  set  zr1  to satisfy  the  incentive
constraint,  (ky'mid = 0, or mr= 9lldb  A producer's  output  then  equals
mlky'm)d  =  (ndr-a&t)d  =  (ktgl/a)r-d(k)d  =  kgr-ud  (4.1)
If the output  from one  period  can  be used  as  tbe  input in the  next  or as  current
consumption,  i.e.,
kr9l-lt  a = cr+ kt+l , (4.2)
we have  a dynamic  version  of the model  akin to neoclassical  growth models.  For an
illustration, consider  the model with the log-linear preferences i  F, ,nrr,.  *"
r=0
maximization  of utility as  represented  by these  preferences,  subject  to (4.1)  and  (4.2),
has  as  its solution
h*t  =  pqr-rtdkt (4.3)
fi Pe7-ud>  1, the equilibrium displays  sustained  growth. Increased  output  in each
period enables  each  producer  to deal with a greater  variety of controllers,  further
increasing  output. We see  that the rate of output growth is sustained  forever at
p9l-\tu,  a consrant.  If instead,  p01-1ta < 1, ouput  continually  declines.  The growth
rate is increasin  g in p, the  importance  the individual places  on the futur€, decreasing  in20
the cost of enforcement  (note that l-1,1a  is negative),  and increasing  in exogenous
productivity  (a).
5.  Conclusion
This  paper presents a  simple model of  the  interconnectedness  of
underdevelopment  and dishonest  behavior  of various sorts.  The two are intertwined in
that when there is a great degree  of comrption, market activity go€s  unrewarded,  and
witlout rewards,  the market  fails to produce  the resources  and  the ex  posf incentives
required  to eliminate  dishonesty.
The mutual importance  of contract  or law enforcement  and market  production  is
most  dramatically  illustrated  by the  multiplicity  of equilibria  displayed  by the  model  of
section  2. Two identical economies  can find themselves  in widely different stable
equilibria, one with a developed  market and honest  behavior and the other with
widespread  corruption  discouraging  all market  activity.  The  key to the multiplicity of
equilibria  is that one's  chances  for getting  away  with dishonest  behavior  depends  on
the number  of others  acting  in the same  way. In the honest  equilibrium  no one will
deviate  from honest  behavior  because  such  behavior,  being  isolated,  will be certainly
caught  and  punished.  If, however,  all others  are  behaving  drshonestly,  one's  chances  of
apprehension  will  fall because  the resources  available  for enforcement  are reduced.
The characterization  of  differences  in  economic  development  as different
realizations  of a model with multiple equilibria has several  precedents,  including
Bryant  (1983),  Kiyotaki (1988),  and  Murphy,  Shliefer,  and  Vishny (1989).  All feature
increasing  returns  to scale  in many uncoordinated  productive  sectors.  Government
coordination  of these  independent  sectors  allows the economies  to select  the Pareto
dominant  equilibrium.  Although similar in spirit to these  efforts, the model of this
paper  does  not assume  increasing  retums  in production.  A more  notable  difference  is2I
that  the  model  may  display  multiple  equilibria  even  though  the  govemment  is following
its optimal policy. The model is closer  in consmrcdon  to microeconomic  models  of
multiple equilibria involving illegal behavior  like Freeman,  Grogger,  and Sonstelie
(1989)  or Smith  and  Wright  (1991).
While models  with multiple  equilibria  explain  why nations  may  find themselves
in distinct, nonconverging  groups  of rich and  poor, they do not address  the question  of
what may lead a nation  into one category  or tlte otler. To answer  this question,  the
model  was altered  in a variety  of ways  to determine  what might induce  the presence
or  absence  of  corrupt, underdeveloped  economies.  Many of  the barriers to
development  were related to govemment  weaknesses.  Govemment  instability, the
inability to commit  to enforcement  or the  repayment  of foreign  loans,  and  the  inability
to coordinate  investment  were each  shown  to make  a nation more likelv to remain
stuck  in a state  of underdevelopment.
Even if all the political problems  can be solved  in a way that eliminates  the
multiplicity  of equilibria,  however,  poor  nations  will find themselves  more  vulnerable  to
colruption  than  rich nations  if the value  of their investment  projects  is less  than the
cost  of enforcement,  opening  an unbridgeable  chasm  between  the rich and  poor. The
chasm  opens  because  poor nations,  lacking the incentives  or resewes  to discourage
corruption,  may fall into a trap  of comrption  that destroys  the incentives  for market
activity. Nations  only marginally  poorer  than others  in endowments  may thus find
themselves  greatly poorer than these  others  in output. Even more disheartening  is
that  if market  activity is necessary  for growth,  the poor  economies,  with their market
activity discouraged  by coruption, will  be unable  to grow rich enough  to end the
comrption that holds them back.22
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